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RILEY V. CALIFORNIA— 
CELL PHONES AND TECHNOLOGY 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Kelly Ozurovich∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well settled that law enforcement officials may search an 
arrestee’s person and surrounding area under his control without a 
warrant when the search is incident to the arrest itself.1 However, 
recent courts have grappled with applying this doctrine to searches in 
the modern era in which most people carry on their persons cell 
phones with powerful capabilities that have only recently 
developed.2 Courts are forced to apply a doctrine designed with 
tangible evidence in mind to devices that digitally, or non-tangibly, 
store immense amounts of data with little direction from the Supreme 
Court.3 
In its recent decision Riley v. California,4 the Supreme Court 
finally addressed the impact technology is having on the Fourth 
Amendment’s “search incident to arrest” doctrine and the growing 
privacy concerns plaguing the courts. The Court considered two 
cases presenting a similar question—whether law enforcement can 
conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone—and 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
Yale University, May 2011. I would like to thank Professor Samantha Buckingham for her hard 
work and input in creating this finished product. 
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2472, 2482–83 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 224 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755, 768 (1969); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).  
2. Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Issues Bold Decision on Cell Phone Privacy,
THINKPROGRESS (June 25, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/06/25 
/3453015/the-supreme-court-finally-starts-to-bring-privacy-into-the-21st-century/. 
3. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27,
36 (2008). 
4. 134 S. Ct. 2472 (2014).
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determined that it could not.5 It came to the correct conclusion that 
law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to searching the 
contents of a cell phone due to the vast amount of personal 
information contained in this device. In so doing, it partially brought 
the Fourth Amendment into the twenty-first century. At the same 
time, however, the Supreme Court hampered the progress it could 
have made by limiting its decision to cell phones instead of including 
other devices that also implement smart technology (“smart 
devices”), which present similar privacy concerns. By limiting its 
decision, the Court created the potential for future litigation and 
resulting circuit splits when lower courts try to apply the search 
incident to arrest doctrine to other smart devices located on an 
arrestee’s person, such as iPads, Apple Watches, Kindles, and the 
like.6 
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Riley v. California, focusing both on its accomplishments and its 
forfeitures, and seeks to provide a solution that could have more fully 
brought the Fourth Amendment into the modern era. Part II discusses 
the evolution of warrantless searches incident to arrest as reasonable 
searches under the Fourth Amendment. Part III details the two cases 
considered in the Supreme Court’s decision, People v. Riley7 and 
United States v. Wurie.8 Part IV addresses the Court’s reasoning in 
concluding that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest 
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.9 
Part V propounds that the Supreme Court came to the correct 
conclusion with respect to cell phones due to the colossal amount of 
personal data stored in these devices. However, this part advocates 
that while the Supreme Court made important advances, it hindered 
itself from achieving resolution on warrantless searches of various 
other smart devices that are likely to present future issues if left 
unresolved. This part thus offers an alternative way to frame the 
issue before the Court that would better address present and future 
5. Id. at 2482, 2495.
6. These devices are all equipped with wireless Internet browsing, have significant storage
capacity, and many make use of Global Positioning Systems (GPS). For further discussion of 
these devices, see infra Part V.B.1 and notes 104–108. 
7. No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d in part sub nom.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
8. 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
9. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
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concerns about both cell phones and non-cell phone smart devices. 
Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court took an important step 
toward bringing the Fourth Amendment into the present but left open 
certain questions that will likely result in future litigation. 
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK—THE SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment establishes “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” and protects the 
people from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”10 Generally, a 
search is unreasonable when it occurs without a warrant.11 However, 
a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement, first discussed 
in Weeks v. United States,12 is a search conducted incident to an 
arrest.13 Known as the search incident to arrest doctrine, this 
exception permits law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search 
of an arrestee, which includes a search of both the person arrested 
and the surrounding area under his control.14 
Since Weeks, several Supreme Court cases have further 
developed the search incident to arrest doctrine. First, in Chimel v. 
California,15 the Court proffered two rationales for the warrantless 
search of a person and his surrounding area incident to an arrest.16 
The first rationale is to protect the officer’s safety.17 Under this 
rationale, law enforcement is reasonable in searching the arrestee or 
the area under his immediate control for any weapons the arrestee 
could use against law enforcement or to implement an escape.18 The 
second rationale is to prevent the destruction or concealment of 
evidence.19 Thus, in Chimel, the Court suppressed evidence police 
officers obtained when they conducted an expansive search incident 
to arrest of the arrestee’s entire three-bedroom house, including areas 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. Id. at 392; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). 
14. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Agnello, 269
U.S. at 30. 
15. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
16. Id. at 763.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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beyond the arrestee’s immediate control, because the search did not 
accomplish or further either of the aforementioned rationales.20 
Several years later, in United States v. Robinson,21 the Supreme 
Court expanded the search incident to arrest doctrine.22 In Robinson, 
the court considered a warrantless search incident to arrest where the 
police had seized a cigarette pack found on the arrestee’s person, 
searched the contents of the cigarette pack, located heroin capsules 
inside, and charged the arrestee with narcotics possession, admitting 
into evidence the heroin capsules.23 In determining whether the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment, and ultimately concluding it 
did not, the Court considered the Chimel justifications.24 It 
propounded, however, that so long as the arrest is lawful and based 
on probable cause, “a search incident to the arrest requires no 
additional justification.”25 Rather,  
[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the
authority to search, and . . . in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is
also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.26
Finally, in Arizona v. Gant,27 the Supreme Court expanded the
search incident to arrest doctrine as applied to searches of vehicles.28 
The Court determined that with respect to persons arrested while 
driving a vehicle, law enforcement can search the vehicle pursuant to 
an arrest if the officers have a reasonable belief that evidence of the 
crime of arrest is located inside the vehicle.29 
The current state of the search incident to arrest doctrine as 
applied to devices containing digital data has created a complicated 
issue for courts. The Supreme Court tried to answer this question in 
Riley v. California, at least as applied to cell phones. 
20. Id.
21. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. See id. at 235.
23. Id. at 223.
24. Id. at 235.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 335 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). 
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III. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA AND UNITED STATES V. WURIE
The recent Supreme Court case Riley v. California considers two 
cases that present what the Court considered a common issue: 
“whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital 
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been 
arrested.”30 The first case, People v. Riley, came up from California 
state court.31 The plaintiff, David Riley, challenged admission of 
photographs and videos obtained during a warrantless search of his 
cell phone.32 A police officer stopped Riley for driving with expired 
registration tags.33 During the course of the stop, the officer learned 
that Riley had been driving with a suspended license.34 Thus, the 
officer arrested Riley and, in accordance with law enforcement 
protocol, impounded his car, at which point “another officer 
conducted an inventory search of the car.”35 
The officers found firearms inside the car and paraphernalia that 
suggested Riley was a gang member.36 Inside Riley’s pocket, the 
officers also found a smartphone and searched through its content 
without a warrant, finding additional references to a gang in the 
phone’s data.37 Approximately two hours after the arrest, while at the 
police station, a detective specializing in gang-related crimes further 
searched the phone’s data, finding incriminating photos and videos.38 
The police officer found a photograph of Riley standing in front 
of a car that was suspected to have been involved in a shooting a few 
weeks prior.39 Riley was charged for his actions in connection with 
the shooting.40 In his defense, Riley attempted to suppress the 
evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his cell phone, but 
the trial court rejected his argument and admitted the evidence.41 
Riley was convicted on all counts.42 The California Court of Appeal 
30. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
31. See People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013),
rev’d in part sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
32. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.
33. Id. at 2480.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2480–81.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2481.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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affirmed and the California Supreme Court denied Riley’s petition to 
review the decision.43 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.44 
Originating from the First Circuit Court of Appeals, United 
States v. Wurie also considered law enforcement’s search of a cell 
phone incident to arrest.45 In this second case, a police officer 
witnessed the defendant, Wurie, engage in a narcotics transaction.46 
He arrested Wurie and took him to the police station, where officers 
located and seized two cell phones from his possession.47 While at 
the station, one of the phones, a flip phone, repeatedly rang from a 
number the officers could see from the external screen was labeled 
“my house.”48 
The officers opened the phone without a warrant and noticed a 
picture of a woman and a baby on the screen of the phone.49 The 
officers searched through the call log and presumably the contact 
information to locate the number associated with the name “my 
house.”50 Upon locating the number, the officers traced it to an 
apartment building and proceeded to that apartment building where 
they noticed through a window a woman resembling the picture on 
the cell phone inside the apartment.51 The officers secured the 
apartment and obtained a warrant to search its contents.52 Inside, the 
police located narcotics and other “drug paraphernalia, a firearm and 
ammunition, and cash.”53 
Subsequently, Wurie was charged with possession of narcotics 
with intent to distribute and “being a felon in possession of a firearm 
and ammunition.”54 Like Riley, Wurie moved to suppress any 
evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his cell phone.55 
The District Court denied the motion, and Wurie was convicted on 
all counts.56 The First Circuit reversed the lower court’s denial of 
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2481–82.
46. Id. at 2481.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2482.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Wurie’s motion to suppress and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.57 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING—
CONSIDERING THESE TWO CASES TOGETHER
The Supreme Court considered these two cases together because 
they presented a common issue: the reasonableness of a warrantless 
search of a cell phone incident to an arrest.58 In a unanimous 
opinion,59 the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that warrantless 
searches of cell phones are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment and thus the evidence obtained via the searches of the 
cell phones incident to the arrests was suppressed in both cases.60 
Chief Justice Roberts made this conclusion explicit: “Our answer to 
the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone 
seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”61 
The Supreme Court came to this conclusion for three reasons. 
First, it addressed the two rationales for warrantless searches incident 
to arrest found in Chimel.62 In applying Chimel, the Court asked 
“whether application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to this 
particular category of effects would ‘untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying the Chimel exception.’”63 With respect to 
the first rationale, to protect law enforcement safety, the Court 
concluded, “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used 
as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the 
arrestee’s escape.”64 Law enforcement retains the ability to inspect 
the exterior of the phone to ensure there is no potential use as a 
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that law enforcement must obtain a
warrant before searching a cell phone, but disagreeing that the search incident to arrest doctrine is 
based on the rationales discussed in Chimel. Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring). He also called on 
the legislature to help balance privacy interests against the needs of law enforcement. Id. at 2496–
97. He emphasized that “it would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the twenty-first
century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth
Amendment” and that “[l]egislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to
assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will
take place in the future.” Id. at 2497–98.
60. Id. at 2495 (majority opinion).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2485–88.
63. Id. at 2485 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
64. Id.
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weapon, but the search ends there.65 The United States and California 
argued that the digital data could protect law enforcement’s safety in 
other indirect ways, by alerting law enforcement that other 
co-conspirators are en route to the scene of arrest.66 However, the 
Court determined that although the government does have a strong 
interest in protecting its officers, permitting a warrantless cell phone 
search would expand the concern in Chimel that the arrestee himself 
would use a weapon against the officer.67 
With respect to the second Chimel rationale, destruction of 
evidence, California and the U.S. government argued that cell phone 
data is susceptible to destruction by either remote wiping or data 
encryption.68 However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument for 
several reasons. First, it determined that again the government had 
expanded the justifications in Chimel by relying on remote actions of 
third parties destroying or obfuscating evidence, rather than the 
arrestee himself concealing evidence.69 Second, the Supreme Court 
found few examples of such remote wiping or data encryption that 
had destroyed evidence after a person was arrested.70 Finally, the 
Court concluded that law enforcement has sufficient means to 
counter the threat of remote wiping and data encryption.71 Thus, the 
Court concluded that neither of the Chimel rationales was furthered 
by searching the digital data on a cell phone. 
Second, the Court refused to extend its decision in Robinson to 
the case of cell phones because “[a] search of the information on a 
cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical 
search considered in Robinson.”72 The Court declined to extend 
Robinson for two main reasons. Primarily, it concluded that cell 
phones are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other 
objects an arrestee might keep on his person based on their immense 
storage capacities.73 Cell phones collect a variety of information such 
as addresses, bank statements, and videos, in a single device.74 By 
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2485–86.
68. Id. at 2486.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2487.
72. Id. at 2485.
73. Id. at 2489.
74. Id.
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compiling such specific information about all aspects of an arrestee’s 
life, law enforcement can easily reconstruct his personal life dating 
back several years.75 This type of expansive search, the Court 
concluded, was completely distinguishable from a search of a 
cigarette pack’s contents.76 
Subsequently, the Court refused to extend Robinson to cell 
phones because of the existence of the cloud,77 which allows law 
enforcement to access digital information that may not even be 
stored on the device itself.78 Thus, a search of cell phones would 
likely “extend well beyond papers and effects in the physical 
proximity of the arrestee,”79 which represents yet another expansion 
of the search incident to arrest doctrine. 
Third, the Supreme Court rejected the U.S. government and 
California’s argument that law enforcement should be able to search 
a cell phone when “it is reasonable to believe that the phone contains 
evidence of the crime of arrest,” the standard in Gant.80 In so doing, 
the Court determined that Gant is unique to searches of vehicles, not 
to cell phones carried on the arrestee.81 Additionally, Gant prohibited 
searches of evidence of past crimes; however, in the context of cell 
phones, “it is reasonable to expect that incriminating information will 
be found on a cell phone regardless of when the crime occurred.”82 
Thus, the Court refused to extend the reasoning in Gant to cell 
phones, preventing law enforcement from conducting warrantless 
searches of cell phones even if searching only for evidence of the 
crime of arrest.83 
Finally, the Court noted that there may be circumstances where 
law enforcement’s need to search a cell phone outweighs an 
arrestee’s privacy concerns.84 In those situations, there still remains 
the exception for exigent circumstances, which will allow the police 
75. Id. at 2489–90.
76. Id. at 2488–89.
77. The cloud is “an off-site storage system” used for storing digital data. Users can access
data stored in the cloud from any location or device that has access to the Internet. Jonathan 
Strickland, How Cloud Storage Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com 
/cloud-computing/cloud-storage.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
78. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2492.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2494.
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to search a cell phone without a warrant if the need is so compelling 
that it justifies a warrantless search as reasonable.85 Thus, although 
the Court concluded that law enforcement must obtain a warrant 
before searching a cell phone’s data, it provided an exception to this 
general rule to better balance the government’s needs against the 
arrestee’s privacy interests. 
V. SUPREME COURT TAKES AN IMPORTANT STEP BUT MISSES AN
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS OTHER PRESSING ISSUES
The Supreme Court finally addressed technology’s impact on
the Fourth Amendment and correctly recognized that certain 
technologies require additional Fourth Amendment protection based 
on the magnitude of data present on a device using such 
technologies. However, the Court missed an important opportunity to 
address greater privacy concerns about warrantless searches of smart 
devices in general, not simply cell phones. This part discusses both 
the Supreme Court’s advances and its shortcomings, offering a 
potential solution that could have better addressed growing privacy 
concerns. 
A. The Supreme Court Evolves the Fourth Amendment
 to Address Modern Concerns 
It is no secret that the Supreme Court has been criticized for its 
failure to understand and address technology and its effects on 
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns. Specifically, the Court “has 
long been mocked, sometimes justifiably, as an old-fashioned, 
tech-phobic institution.”86 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court took an 
important and significant step in Riley toward bringing the Fourth 
Amendment into the modern era.87 Notably, the Supreme Court has 
come a long way since questioning the difference between an email 
and a pager.88 Many have described the unanimous decision here as a 
“resounding victory for digital privacy” and a “‘no-duh’ moment for 
85. Id.
86. Farhad Manjoo, The Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES BITS (June 26, 2014, 3:58
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/the-tech-savvy-supreme-court/?_php=true&_type 
=blogs&_r=0. 
87. Millhiser, supra note 2.
88. Manjoo, supra note 86.
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American justice.”89 The Supreme Court appears to recognize that 
the long-standing search incident to arrest doctrine, almost a century 
old, may be outdated in today’s digital society.90 It determined that 
this exception to the general warrant requirement has limits, and it 
set the limit at cell phones.91 
Legal scholars have proffered several theories as to why the 
Supreme Court is finally addressing technology. Some scholars 
wondered whether the Justices were imagining what it would be like 
for law enforcement to search through their cell phones without a 
warrant.92 Others have speculated that the Justices were engaging in 
what one scholar refers to as equilibrium-adjustment, where courts 
“respond to . . . new facts by adjusting legal rules to restore the 
preexisting balance of police power.”93 When “changing 
technology . . . expands police power, threatening civil liberties, 
courts can tighten Fourth Amendment rules to restore the status 
quo.”94 Thus, pursuant to this theory, the Supreme Court likely may 
have seen an expansion of police power that undermined privacy 
concerns implicated by warrantless searches of cell phones.95 
Furthermore, the Justices who initially created and developed 
this doctrine could not have understood how it would affect privacy 
concerns in a society in which “many people carry a small device in 
their pocket that can access years worth of their emails and text 
messages, that can reveal a suspect’s finances and romantic partners, 
and that may contain extensive photo and video evidence of how 
they lead their lives.”96 Cell phones’ Global Positioning Systems 
89. Sarah Jeong, The Supreme Court Finally Understands Technology—And It’s About
Damn Time, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2014/jun/25/supreme-court-cellphones-john-roberts-precedent-privacy. 
90. Millhiser, supra note 2.
91. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
92. Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., The Supreme Court Justices Have Cellphones, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2014, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/opinion/linda 
-greenhouse-the-supreme-court-justices-have-cellphones-too.html?hp&action=click&pgtype
=Homepage&module=c-column-top-span-region&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=
c -column-top-span-region&_r=0.
93. Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 482 (2011–2012) [hereinafter Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory]; Orin Kerr, Are Jones 
and Riley Explained by the Justices Imagining Themselves as Targets?, WASH. POST VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014 
/06 /26/are-jones-and-riley-explained-by-the-justices-imagining-themselves-as-targets/. 
94. Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory, supra note 93, at 482.
95. See id.
96. Millhiser, supra note 2.
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(GPS) also pose significant privacy concerns not present at the 
drafting of the Fourth Amendment.97 With current technology, as 
long as a cell phone is turned on, it “registers its position with cell 
towers every few minutes, whether the phone is being used or not.”98 
Additionally, cell phone carriers maintain records of this location 
data, allowing the government to obtain a user’s location details, 
including the friends he visits, what doctor he sees, and even how 
often he attends church.99 Chimel considered the search of a 
three-bedroom house, and Robinson analyzed the search of a 
cigarette pack’s contents.100 But Riley considered the propriety of 
searches of devices that carry far more information than could ever 
fit on an arrestee’s person or in areas within his immediate control in 
its physical form. Society is rapidly entering a digital age, and new 
technological devices “defy the rationales for old rules, demanding 
changes in the law.”101 In Riley, the Supreme Court finally 
demonstrated that it understood this notion, recognizing that cell 
phones are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other 
items typically searched incident to an arrest.102 
B. The Supreme Court Failed to Fully Protect Additional
Privacy Rights Relevant to the Modern Era 
The Supreme Court correctly recognized that cell phones present 
unique privacy issues not readily apparent at the time the Founding 
Fathers drafted the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court failed to 
address privacy concerns that arise from non–cell phone smart 
devices, which will likely be an issue in the coming years. Thus, the 
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to address smart devices in 
general, as opposed to the limited issue of cell phones. This section 
discusses both the problems with the Supreme Court’s limited 
97. How the Government Is Tracking Your Movements, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/how-government-tracking-your-movements (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 754 (1969). 
101. Byron Kish, Cellphone Searches: Works Like a Computer, Protected Like a Pager?, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 473 (2011); Mason Clutter, Symposium: The Court Starts to Catch Up 
with Technology, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014 
/06/symposium-the-court-starts-to-catch-up-with-technology/; Richard Re, Symposium: 
Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourth-amendment/. 
102. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
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decision and one way it could have better protected growing privacy 
interests. 
1. Problems with Riley
The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley suffers from three main 
flaws: (1) it does not address the increasingly pressing concern of 
smart devices as opposed to only cell phones; (2) it provides little 
guidance on how to apply Riley’s reasoning to searches incident to 
arrest of these other devices; and (3) it has the potential to confuse 
lower courts about when adherence to pre-digital precedent is 
unnecessary. The first problem stems from the Supreme Court’s 
limitation of its decision to cell phones. In general, as smartphones 
become more affordable, the number of people trading their ordinary 
cell phones for smartphones has increased exponentially.103 
Specifically, the percentage of Americans that have a cell phone that 
is not a smartphone has dropped 33 percent since 2005.104 
Additionally, while only 25 percent of Americans over the age of 
sixty-five have a smartphone, 88 percent of eighteen to twenty-nine 
year-olds report having a smartphone.105 The percentage of 
Americans who also own other smart devices, such as iPads,106 
Kindles,107 iPods,108 and Apple Watches109 has likewise continued to 
grow since 2005.110 
103. Smartphone Users Worldwide Will Total 1.75 Billion in 2014, EMARKETER (Jan. 16,
2014), http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Smartphone-Users-Worldwide-Will-Total-175-Billion 
-2014/1010536.
104. Bruce Drake, Americans with Just Basic Cell Phones Are a Dwindling Breed, FACTANK
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/09/americans-wi1th-just-basic-cell 
-phones-are-a-dwindling-breed/.
105. Id.
106. An iPad is a tablet with a 9.7 inch screen equipped with Wi-Fi and optional 3G or 4G
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These statistics indicate that society is increasingly using 
smartphones, leaving ordinary cell phones behind, and relying more 
heavily on other forms of smart devices. Thus, by limiting its 
decision to cell phones, rather than extending it to smart devices, the 
Supreme Court left open the question of whether law enforcement 
can search other technological devices pursuant to the search 
incident to arrest doctrine. Given the increase in the number of 
Americans that use other forms of smart devices and the decision’s 
limitation to cell phones, litigation will undoubtedly occur over 
searches incident to arrest of these other devices, without much 
guidance from the Supreme Court.111 
The Supreme Court’s decision suffers from another flaw: it is 
not easily applicable to these new forms of technology over which 
litigation will likely ensue. By considering the Riley and Wurie cases 
together, the Supreme Court made it more difficult to apply its 
reasoning universally to other technologies.112 
In Riley, the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge the important 
distinction between smartphones and other cell phones.113 
Specifically, the cell phone in Riley was an iPhone equipped with 
smart technology whereas the cell phone in Wurie was a non-smart 
ordinary flip phone.114 The Supreme Court’s main reasoning in 
refusing to apply the search incident to arrest doctrine to cell phones 
was the colossal amount of information stored on these devices that 
is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other items 
typically searched incident to arrest.115 It recognized that because of 
their complex technology, cell phones “could just as easily be called 
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, 
libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”116 
However, what the Supreme Court did not consider is that these 
characteristics are only typical of smartphones and other smart 
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/apple-watch/. 
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devices, not the flip phone found in Wurie.117 Specifically, ordinary 
cell phones or flip phones are “not commonly used as newspapers or 
televisions, and most are not Wi-Fi enabled, come with minimal 
memory, have few or no apps, have limited contacts, and cannot 
effectively surf the web, sync with the cloud, or download files.”118 
Additionally, the Court failed to consider that such characteristics, 
while not typical of an ordinary cell phone, are common to many 
other smart devices increasingly used by many Americans, such as 
iPads and iPods. 
By considering the two cases together and failing to address the 
differences between a cell phone and a smartphone, the Supreme 
Court made it difficult to discern what the important factors are in 
determining whether law enforcement may search a specific device 
incident to an arrest.119 It would be reasonable for a court to assume 
that the ability to make and receive phone calls is dispositive, given 
the Court’s grouping together of the general category of cell 
phones.120 
Another possibility, however, is for a court to assume that there 
is a spectrum between the privacy interests at stake in an ordinary 
cell phone versus a smartphone, under which devices that fall 
somewhere in between could not be searched incident to an arrest 
without a warrant. Many of the other smart devices such as the 
Kindle, Apple Watch, and iPad implicate fewer privacy concerns 
than the iPhone in Riley, but more privacy concerns then the cell 
phone in Wurie.121 Perhaps courts could hold that these other devices 
are not searchable without a warrant because the arrestee’s privacy 
interests in these devices are somewhere between the two devices 
discussed in Riley. Applying this case to other smart devices will 
likely perplex courts because the Supreme Court did not address the 
important distinction between an ordinary cell phone and a 
smartphone. 
Third, the Supreme Court, in distinguishing Robinson from 
Riley, may have sent a confusing message to lower courts trying to 
apply pre-digital precedent to digital data. The Supreme Court made 
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clear in Robinson that, incident to an arrest, law enforcement “can 
open containers located on a person or in their immediate grabbable 
zone without having any independent probable cause to search those 
containers.”122 However, until recently, many of the cases relying on 
Robinson related to searches of tangible evidence, namely drugs and 
firearms.123 In Riley, the Supreme Court easily distinguished the 
cigarette pack and heroin capsules from the digital data stored in a 
cell phone. However, the Court sent an unfortunate message to lower 
courts—do not strictly adhere to pre-digital precedent as applied to 
digital Fourth Amendment questions.124 Thus, with respect to new 
technologies other than cell phones, distinct circuit splits are likely to 
emerge,125 as courts may feel entitled to certain leeway in adhering 
or failing to adhere to pre-digital precedent. 
Although the Supreme Court correctly decided the issue before 
it and made important advances in bringing the Fourth Amendment 
into the modern era, its decision is not as powerful, decisive, and 
relevant as needed. The Supreme Court took a step back by grouping 
flip phones, largely a thing of the past, with smartphones and failed 
to consider the privacy concerns of new and increasing smart 
devices. Additionally, by considering both the Wurie and Riley cases 
together without addressing their important differences, the Court 
made its decision inapplicable to these other emerging areas of 
technology, or, if applicable, largely confusing. 
2. Potential Solution—Framing the Issue More Broadly
The Supreme Court could have better addressed present and 
future technology concerns by framing the issue differently to 
answer a broader question. The Supreme Court framed its decision as 
answering a common question, whether the police may conduct a 
warrantless search incident to arrest of a cell phone.126 However, as 
discussed above, the Court’s consideration of this common question 
suffers from several flaws that hinder the Supreme Court from fully 
bringing the Fourth Amendment into the modern era.127 
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The Court had an easily available solution; it could have framed 
the issue more broadly to encompass both cell phones and other 
smart devices. The issue could and should have been framed as 
follows: whether law enforcement without a warrant can search a cell 
phone or device equipped with smart technology incident to an 
arrest. In so doing, it would answer the question of ordinary cell 
phones, smartphones, and non–cell phone smart devices, such as 
iPads, Kindles, and the like, thus accomplishing far more than the 
Court did in its current opinion. Additionally, as mentioned above, 
there are stated concerns regarding an increase in litigation over the 
future of warrantless searches;128 by framing the issue this way, the 
Court would have addressed and eliminated these concerns. 
To do so, the Supreme Court would have had to acknowledge 
the distinction between Wurie’s cell phone and Riley’s smartphone 
but easily could have held that both present significant privacy 
concerns such that a warrant is always required. By framing the issue 
in this slightly different way, the Supreme Court could have easily 
made its decision applicable to any of the aforementioned devices, as 
well as many new technologies likely to emerge. Thus, had the 
Supreme Court chosen this route, not only would it have brought the 
Fourth Amendment into the present day, it would have issued a 
decision that is equally applicable in the future. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. 
California represents a very important step toward bringing the 
Fourth Amendment into the modern era and providing more 
protection for individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
However, the decision simultaneously suffers from several flaws in 
failing to consider the decision’s effect on other non–cell phone 
smart devices, which are only increasing in usage. By failing to 
consider these other devices, the Court opened itself to future 
litigation applying Riley to these devices, especially considering the 
Court’s inability to distinguish an ordinary cell phone from a smart 
phone. Finally, by distinguishing Riley from Robinson, the Court 
may have sent an unfortunate and confusing message to lower courts 
about adhering to pre-digital precedent—sometimes it is not 
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necessary. All of these concerns could and should have been avoided 
by framing the issue more broadly, so as to include both cell phones 
and smart devices. The Supreme Court ultimately came to the correct 
conclusion in its decision, but it may have created more work for 
itself in the near future answering this same search incident to arrest 
question applied to even newer technologies. The next few years will 
elucidate whether this decision was too limited. 
